Penguins & H5N1 Bird Flu
Penguin Susceptibility
Penguins are considered at high risk of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), due to dense breeding habits and behaviour. Like many seabirds, penguins are social, primarily residing in colonies, interacting closely with one another on land and at sea. Penguins nest in close proximity and raft offshore in groups, which allows the lethal H5N1 virus to spread rapidly from bird to bird. Little Penguins are at very high risk of H5N1, an Australian government assessment has revealed.
Global Penguin Impact
Past and ongoing outbreaks in South America, the sub-Antarctic, and Australia have demonstrated mass infection events and high mortality (75-100%) in species such King, Gentoo, African, and Little Penguins. As the majority of penguin populations are already pressured by overfishing and climate change, H5N1 outbreaks pose a catastrophic threat to population viability regarding immediate localised extinction risk, and long-term national extinction. Key colonies and highly threatened remnant populations will suffer devastating impacts without action. Overseas, penguins are targeted as a priority species to preempt H5N1 mortality via vaccination, due to being under threat of serious permanent loss.
H5N1 Vaccine
Standard inactivated vaccines require a two-dose regime to effectively halt viral shedding, whilst an advanced single-dose VLP vaccine triggers swift, long-lasting antibody counts facilitating immunity with no adverse effects. Each penguin must be safely caught and handled twice to receive the two-dose vaccine course, with an initial vaccination and a follow up booster within 2-4 weeks. As Little Penguins reliably return to the same burrows and colonies regarding high site fidelity, wildlife organisations have a unique window to catch, vaccinate, and monitor penguins. Wildlife teams intercept penguins by corralling into a small pen, where a vaccine is administered and a microchip implanted. For each penguin, the process is quick, with each individual handled for a very brief time. In managed fenced reserves, this is simpler still by retaining penguins in situ.
Penguin Vaccination Rollout
Counter to New Zealand government inaction, Australia has launched the world's largest wild bird vaccination programme, prioritising thousands of Little Penguins (E. m. novaehollandiae) to enable immunity against the devastating H5N1 strain. Wildlife authorities are urgently vaccinating over 5,000 penguins. Vaccine deployment escalated rapidly in mid-August 2026 after Australia confirmed its first H5N1 penguin death on Phillip Island, with penguin mortality rates rising in Tasmania. Worst-case modeling indicates an unchecked outbreak could wipe out 40% of the colony within six weeks.
King Penguins (Aptenodytes patagonicus) have been at the centre of groundbreaking H5N1 mRNA vaccine implementation, serving as the primary model for sub-Antarctic wild seabird protection. As King Penguins breed in exceptionally tight colonies en masse and have extended chick-rearing periods, they are highly vulnerable to H5N1 outbreaks.
Vaccination is being trialled in African Penguins (Spheniscus demersus) making these early pioneers for testing immunisation, before mass wild rollouts were undertaken. Because African penguins are critically endangered (starvation induced overfishing impacts) and highly vulnerable to outbreaks—with H5N1 actively threatening colonies—facilitating an effective vaccine is a conservation priority.
Vaccine Accessibility
New Zealand has privileged market access. With American vaccine manufacturer Zoetis and Christchurch company Pacifivet producing the vaccine (provided to DOC free of charge), the Trust has queried how limited the current vaccine supply is. The only justification that would have merit, is limited vaccine stock at present. The Trust sought verification, and requested that if that were the case, that more vaccine supply is planned and allocated. Again, DOC failed to address this inquiry. Facilitating vaccination is highly feasible and effective in penguins - there are no limiting factors.
NZ Government Inaction
In New Zealand, the Department of Conservation (DOC) and Ministry For Primary Industries (MPI) have failed to prepare effectively for the arrival of H5N1, which has been decimating wildlife populations in the northern hemisphere since 2020.
MPI modeling is inadequate by international standards, whilst the DOC species prioritisation system is flawed and limited to threat classification only, failing to incorporate multi-threat assessments for highly vulnerable populations already at risk of extinction, where vaccination is a critical and necessary tool to prevent total loss.
Preemptive vaccination is far more effective than reactive vaccination, requiring 80% of the population to be vaccinated to significantly reduce deaths. Despite urgent appeals to consider penguin vaccination approval, DOC and the Minister of Conservation have rejected vaccination requests.
There is presently a slow vaccination rollout limited to 5 species; with failure to consider high risk colonial seabird species such as penguins; negligence in failing to undertake multi-threat assessments, and lack of oversight to assess exceptional cases where regional extinction is inevitable without vaccine approval - due to remnant population size, existing threats, and intensive management reliance for survival.
In a Ministerial review, the Trust sought to establish exactly what DOC assessed, rather than merely receiving the conclusion of that assessment. The Trust also requested a basis for what would trigger a reassessment. The response failed to provide any information on modeling, methodology, or population level assessment.
Lack Of Engagement
Lack of transparency from DOC and the Minister, make it abundantly clear that the response is to bide time by intentionally stalling and blocking resolutions for penguin vaccination requests. Conservation organisations request relevant information, which is being withheld. These are reasonable queries, which deserve answers. Provide the data: Was a multi-threat assessment undertaken for Kororā, and specifically highly vulnerable populations such as Kaikōura? Were any penguin experts nationally or internationally involved to inform DOC and MPI decision making processes? Who set the criteria, based on what scientific evidence? Why are criteria other than threat status not considered? How much vaccine supply does New Zealand have access to presently? How rapidly can more be produced and allocated? What is the cost per dose? In applicable scenarios, why are NGO conservation groups not able to self-fund and manage DOC-authorised vaccinations via approved personnel?
Kaikōura Penguins
Little Penguins/Kororā in Kaikōura consist of Blue Penguins (E. m. minor, At-Risk Declining) and White-Flippered Penguins (E. m. albosignata, Endemic to Canterbury, Endangered), with a remnant population at risk of local extinction.
The Trust has queried whether any technical assessment was made by DOC for Kororā vaccination, beyond ruling out threat status. The Trust sought rationale for what an assessment is based on for Kororā — and, importantly, whether the regionally endangered Kaikōura population (<50 individuals) was assessed in its own right. DOC failed to provide this information, nor any scientifically robust peer reviewed data or verified evidence, resulting in an Official Information Act request.
The justification that Kororā have not been included because they are not considered at risk of national extinction from H5N1, is concerning. Lack of pre-empting loss will undoubtedly result in reclassification to a nationally endangered threat status, given expected unparalleled loss from HPAI in conjunction with existing human related threats.
National extinction risk is one consideration, but it does not inform on the vulnerability of a particular at-risk colony or the consequences of losing a significant local population regarding wider context. This is a distinction that is particularly important in Kaikōura.
The Trust has invested immense charitable effort into Kaikōura Kororā to facilitate survival, and is the only organisation that aids this taonga. This locally endangered population faces pressures that are not reflected by the national conservation status of the species. The level of volunteer managed conservation work focused on survival measures implemented for Kaikōura Kororā, is unparalleled at a national scale.
Key Considerations
Whilst vaccination is not a silver bullet, it is a targeted tool proven to reduce the impact of the lethal H5N1 virus to safeguard critically at risk populations, whilst continuing to address existing threats such as seabird starvation from fishery and climate impacts.
Small extinction prone populations which are immune compromised due to compounding threats such as fisheries induced starvation, have no chance to build immunity against the virus and will be wiped out immediately, nor will penguins attain any natural immunity when considering international evidence. Example, the critically endangered African Penguin has not developed any natural immunity to H5N1. Highly pathogenic avian influenza continues to pose a severe and ongoing mortality threat to colonies, requiring active intervention and targeted vaccine trials rather than broad natural resistance.
Vitally, government has failed to consider that other measures to assist will not be possible regarding the inability to aid starving penguins. With no local quarantine capability, disease screening capacity, nor wildlife hospital facilities or resources available; uplifting and admitting starving penguins for rearing or rehabilitation will be impossible regarding H5N1 infection risk. As well as the fact that any welfare work in an unvaccinated colony would increase H5N1 transmission risk, regarding human movement between nest boxes, given penguin density within highly limited small reserve footprints.
It is therefore no exaggeration to state that without vaccination, Kaikōura Kororā will succumb to instant cumulative mortality from starvation and H5N1. Vaccination approval is an immensely time sensitive issue, as mass mortality is guaranteed to occur. With the return of migratory shearwaters (over-wintering in Australian waters) in inshore Kaikōura waters, H5N1 is now considered to be in the region. Once the virus is present in Kororā colonies it may be impossible to achieve adequate vaccine coverage to ensure immunity.
New Zealand is the seabird and penguin capital of the world, with 90% of seabirds threatened with extinction. Government inaction will enable penguin extinctions — despite vaccine availability and evidence to act with urgency. The Minister of Conservation, DOC and MPI consider extinction events an acceptable outcome regarding continued rejection of penguin vaccination requests.
Existing Pressures
Starvation is a primary threat and remains a continuous silent killer — regarding climate change, recreational fishing and commercial fishing impacts suppressing prey availability (decreased ocean productivity). Kaikōura Kororā suffer from extraordinary foraging impacts, with starvation associated reproductive impairment and high mortality, compared to other regions (followed by the Hauraki Gulf, Bay of Plenty, and Abel Tasman).
El Niño conditions worsen prevailing starvation pressure, with the current El Niño cycle underway intensifying rapidly and expected to be the strongest in recorded history by this summer. This unprecedented super El Niño will result in the worst seabird starvation event in New Zealand to date. It is imperative that a vaccination request is approved, to ensure starving penguins can be assisted directly, and to prevent additional mortality from H5N1.
H5N1 will result in extreme population loss in its own right, whilst the inability to aid starving penguins (if remain unvaccinated and at risk of infection) will equate to a double blow, and total loss in Kaikōura regarding expected regional extinction. The loss of this critical population in a global seabird capital, would further fragment the overall population.
As the risk of H5N1 spread increases, the opportunity to act in a timely response is closing. The Trust queries whether DOC is doing all that can be done to pursue preventative measures, and considers government inaction indefensible.
Legality
The DOC prioritisation ranking was pre-selected based on threat status, vs considering population management and specific multi-threat assessments based on international standards. In catastrophic scenarios such as H5N1 impacts, weighting should not be based on population size, but the vulnerability of populations. DOC's weighting for species such as Kororā is inherently flawed, labelling species as a non-priority, and/or suggesting that only a marginal percentage of the population could be vaccinated. Adequate systems and models used to inform conservation management, are not being applied for emergency use.
Opting not to prioritise species that have a chance of recovery with H5N1 intervention, is a decision not to resource and will lead to unparalled loss. As DOC's response is that Kororā do not qualify as there are deemed to be “sufficient numbers” nationally, this poses a legitimate legal question on whether frameworks adequately protect important local populations before they suffer fragmentation beyond repair, catastrophic population loss, and localised extinctions.
DOC’s continued position is that the impact of HPAI H5 bird flu on New Zealand’s wildlife is best mitigated by improving species’ resilience. Seabirds such as penguins are no longer resilient due to decreased ocean productivity from human related impacts - an aspect that government continues to fail to acknowledge or address.
DOC states that “a vaccination program is burdensome, particularly for long-term species management.” Charitable conservation organisations undertake this work, and the onus is therefore not on DOC. DOC also states that '“increased intervention can only be rationalised in the presence of a critical extinction risk”, which many populations will face.
The current response from DOC and MPI in regard to H5N1 despite known existing threats, equates to multi-system failure and serious shortcomings. This is a willful lack of intervention and breach of obligations.
Vaccination Appeal - Correspondence: 1) DOC Response, 2) Trust Response, 3) Trust Letter - Ministerial Review, 4) Trust Letter - DOC Review, 5) Trust Letter - OIA, 6) DOC Response, 7) Trust Response, 8) Minister Response.
